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Abstract
We envision the creation of a climate liability market to address climate
change. Each period, countries are issued liability commensurate to their
emissions of the period. Liability bearers are required to pay over time, as
climate harm materializes. Revenues are used to compensate participating
countries in proportion of climate harm. Because liabilities are traded
like financial debt among participants, the mechanism achieves a unique
carbon price through decentralization of the choice of a discount rate
as well as beliefs about the severity of the climate problem. We discuss
properties of such a mechanism along the dimensions of efficiency, fairness,
exposure to risk, commitment, participation, as well as implementation
challenges.
Keywords: Climate Liability, Market Instruments, Pigovian Tax, Risk Shar-
ing.
JEL classification code: Q54, H23.
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1 Introduction
Climate change is already impacting populations. Insurance markets are re-
sponding accordingly: In 2016, economic losses attributed to weather-related
events worldwide totaled USD 123 billion, of which USD 37 billion were insured
(Swiss Re Institute, 2017). Given the amounts involved, responsibility for cli-
mate harm is no longer a question of mere abstract justice, but a matter of
very real consequences. Moreover, there seems to be a mounting willingness to
adress “loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change”
(UNFCCC, 2015, Art. 8) as outlined in the Paris Agreement : At least one
company is being sued over its responsibility in current climate harm due to
historical emissions (Frank, 2017) and evidence has been compiled tracing more
than two thirds of cumulative greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to existing busi-
nesses (CDP, 2017).
The aim of this article is to envision how this recent shift in attitudes, to-
wards assessing the realization of climate harm and holding emitters account-
able, could translate into an economic instrument. The mechanism we envision
works as follows: when a country emits GHGs at any given date, it contracts
a financial debt of sorts, that will have to be repaid over time as climate harm
materializes. The funds collected go towards compensating the climate harm of
participating countries. This climate liability is a tradable financial title, that
can be exchanged among participating countries. Whether a country chooses
to purchase or to sell liabilities depends on its expected discounted value of
global marginal harm. Introducing a market for climate liability allows for the
aggregation of these values across countries into a single carbon price.
The mechanism operates in three steps, to be repeated at regular intervals
(say, every 5 years): 1) Evaluating the climate harm suffered by each country for
the current period in excess of a baseline (say, climate harm circa 1990). Denote
by hi the excess harm suffered by country i, adding up to H globally; and 2)
Charging each country a price λ per unit of its contribution to the increase in
the stock of GHGs since the baseline year (i.e., 1990 in our example), Si, so that
each country is required to pay Siλ. 3) Redistributing the proceeds to countries
in proportion of the excess climate harm they suffer.
The mechanism adopts an ex post standpoint rather than the familiar ex ante
approach of all economic instruments introduced thus far, from carbon taxes to
cap-and-trade schemes.1 This article is devoted to exploring the pros and the
1It should be clear to the reader that although we use the term “liability”, we do not
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cons of this reversed perspective. The analysis will focus on the specific liability
scheme where liability payments are set equal to marginal harm: λ ≡ H ′.
Although motivated chiefly by compensation (Art. 8 of the Paris Agree-
ment), it turns out that setting liability payments equal to marginal harm incen-
tivizes emissions reductions in an efficient way (Art. 6 of the Paris Agreement):
when countries are homogeneous in how they treat the future (discounting) and
forecast climate harm (expectations), the mechanism leads to emissions pat-
terns that are first-best efficient (Proposition 1). Furthermore, if countries are
homogenous, there is no need for countries to trade liabilities.
If countries disagree in their calculation of the expected discounted harm,
then the existence of a market for liabilities becomes useful. Importantly, it
allows for the possibility of arriving at an efficient outcome without the need
of parties reaching an agreement on the discount rate nor on future climate
scenarios. Agreement is reached through decentralization. We show that when
default risk is taken into account, the unique (shadow) price on GHG emissions
is higher than the social cost of carbon (Proposition 2), thus leading to a further
reduction in emissions.
We also quantify the temptation for any country to default on its liability
payments and show that it is no greater than the temptation to delay the im-
plementation of a Pigovian carbon tax (Proposition 3). These results indicate
that the political economy problems surrounding an ex post approach are just
as severe—no more, no less—than under the familiar ex ante viewpoint.
Yet, to be truly effective, the mechanism must garner (voluntary) participa-
tion. Because the mechanism operates transfers that are aimed at compensating
harm rather than garanteeing participation, some net contributors may not see
participation as an improvement of their own condition over the business-as-
usual scenario. This is the price to pay to correct for the inequalities generated
by the spatial idiosyncracies of climate harm. Nevertheless, if participants are
similar enough, the liability scheme results in a Pareto improvement due to the
fact that the joint gains from reduced climate harm more than makes up for
the outlays of the net contributors (Proposition 4). Moreover, the more partic-
ipants, the higher the incentives to participate; this hints at the possibility of a
positive unraveling effect spurred by an initial “coalition of the willing”.
The formal model and the above results are presented in Section 3, after an
intend that the climate change problem is to be solved by resorting to legal action—i.e., court
trials—to punish tortfeasors (which are essentially every single country, because all bear some
responsibility for climate harm for ever having emitted greenhouse gases).
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overview of the related literature (Section 2). The remainder of the article is a
discussion of the features of the mechanism as informed by the model (Section
4) as well as a broader discussion, extending beyond the model, of the imple-
mentation challenges of a climate liability market and of the commitment and
participation (Section 5).
In Section 6, we will reach the conclusion that choosing between an ex ante or
an ex post policy amounts to choosing between, on the one hand, an absence of a
(long-term) commitment—with the ex ante approach—and, on the other hand,
a genuine responsibility towards the consequences of climate change, greater
international participation, and a more equitable distribution of the burden
across generations—with the ex post approach. Economic efficiency, however,
is unaffected by the choice of viewpoint. In fact, this thought experiment leads
us to the realization that a climate policy can follow the Pigovian logic and
yield first-best incentives while not exacting the full payment of the social cost
of carbon at the time of emission.
2 Relation to the literature
The idea of using liability as a means to control externalities traces back to
Calabresi (1970) and was recently compared to corrective taxation in Shavell
(2011).2 On the one hand, regulation (i.e., taxation) is costly even in the ab-
sence of harm, whereas liability only kicks in when harm actually occurs. On
the other hand, a liability approach is typically more informationally demanding
because, following legal procedure, it requires establishing tort (Kolstad et al,
1990; Shavell, 2011) or at least being able to observe the level of precaution-
ary effort exerted by the examined party (Hiriart et al., 2004, 2010).3 Hence,
liability is likely to be more appropriate in situations where harm is highly un-
certain but where its source can be easily established. This is precisely the case
of climate change, where the magnitude of harm is typically unknown ex ante
but the responsibility of countries towards CO2 concentration can be readily
established thanks to available data on cumulative CO2 emissions per country
2The issue of liability for climate change has already been raised for some years by legal
scholars (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2007; Faure and Peeters, 2011; Lord et al.,
2012), who focus on the legal framework’s ability to handle climate-related losses.
3The liability approach is usually discussed in the context of tort law, involving private
parties and legal costs attached to lawsuits, to establishing due care and negligence. By con-
trast, the liability approach we consider here is public, in the sense that it involves countries,
and would consist in an automatic procedure where the negligence rule plays no role.
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(e.g., from the World Resource Institute or the World Bank databases). The
general argument echoes that of Shleifer (2012), according to which the need for
regulation arises where litigation is ineffective. Underlying this line of reasoning
is the notion that turning to litigation—i.e., liability—is a most natural reflex
that should be left unhindered whenever it is an efficient option.
The use of liabilities to address the climate problem is further supported
by insights from the cost-sharing literature. An important lesson to be learned
from that literature is that the best properties of a payment scheme—whether
in terms of efficiency, incentives, and even fairness—arise from mirroring the
physical features of the externality to be managed (Moulin, 2002). Along those
lines, and as we shall evidence below, the very fact of asking payments as long
as damage occurs (instead of ex ante) is likely to result in a strict improvement
along several dimensions. Climate harm being a problem caused by the stock
of CO2 in the atmosphere, it is thus appropriate to condition payment on emis-
sion stocks rather than on emission flows as do carbon taxes and cap-and-trade
programs. Ambec and Ehlers (2016) have recently shown in a wide variety of
externality problems that the polluter-pays principle (i.e., requiring polluters to
compensate victims) leads to the unique welfare-enhancing redistribution that
also holds polluters responsible for their actions. Carbon liabilities can be seen
as expanding on the polluter-pays principle by focusing on specific features of
the climate externality problem, particularly by unfolding the time and uncer-
tainty dimensions. By making explicit—and, most importantly, financial—the
somewhat intangible carbon debt that mankind accumulates along with atmo-
spheric CO2, climate liabilities do just that.
In a climate change context, liability has very recently been proposed as a
means of making global cooperation more effective and less costly in the long
run (Gampfer, Gsottbauer and Delas, 2014). Its merit lies in the fact that
countries are more likely to adhere to an agreement on emissions reductions if
they believe they will be compensated fairly for future climate damage incurred
(Gampfer, 2014). As in Billette de Villemeur and Leroux (2011), the argument
in these works is one of fairness. Although we include a fairness objective (i.e.,
compensating the idiosyncrasies of climate harm), an important feature of the
liability mechanism is that it comes at no cost to efficiency. Moreover, the
mechanism makes participation appealing (see Proposition 4 and Section 5.3
below). This lessens the distortions that arise due to limited participation. In
other words, climate liabilities mitigate the externality on a larger scale (more
participants) and garner participation without compromising efficiency.
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Our contribution is related to the literature on green accounting, which in-
corporates environmental externalities into national accounting (see Weitzman
1976; Hartwick, 1990; or, more recently, Cairns, 2004, Cairns and Lasserre,
2006). The goal there is to give an intertemporal account of a country’s avail-
able resources so as to measure how much is left to future generations. Many
indicators, environmental and otherwise, including more than 150 Sustainable
Development Goal Indicators proposed formally by the United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Council (UN Statistical Commission, 2016), have flourished
over the past decades. While informative, they are only tenuously tied to precise
action, if at all. This calls into question the incentives they are able to generate.
By contrast, the liability mechanism consists in providing a single indicator of
indebtedness for climate change that directly impacts policy, because climate
liabilities imply payments upon the realization of harm. Moreover, the financial
stakes involved generate powerful incentives to provide accurate predictions of
future harm. As such, our work is in line with the burgeoning literature on stake-
holder value. The latter argues in favor of moving away from the conventional
shareholder value maximization to stakeholder value maximization (Magill et
al., 2015). In our proposal, the financialization of carbon emissions as debt can
be seen as giving voice to global (and future) stakeholders.
Many authors have proposed alternatives to a carbon tax and to cap-and-
trade programs with the aim of facilitating global cooperation. Closely related to
ours are two proposals by Gersbach and Winkler. Gersbach and Winkler (2011)
propose an international emissions permit market with refunding, which they
find to lead to welfare improvements and, if the share of freely allocated goes
to zero, to a level of emissions that is close to optimal. The liability mechanism
we envision achieves exactly the optimal emissions path when countries are
identical (Gersbach and Winkler only consider the case of identical countries),
with welfare improvements being guaranteed when countries are homogeneous
enough (Proposition 4).
At the opposite end of the price-versus-quantities spectrum, Gersbach and
Winkler (2012) propose a global refunding scheme that is similar to our liabil-
ity mechanism in that both experiment with the timing of the payments. In
our case, payments are backloaded, incentivizing participation at the expense
of commitment. By contrast, their scheme does the opposite: because countries
must contribute large sums to a fund at the start (which are then reimbursed
as a function of emissions abatement) commitment is not an issue, but partic-
ipation certainly is. In sum, there is a symmetry of sorts between the liability
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mechanism we envision and the global refunding scheme of Gersbach and Win-
kler.
Of course, the effectiveness of the liability scheme rests upon the hypothesis
that countries emitting today will have the ability to pay their dues in the distant
future. Because emissions reductions can be seen as an investment towards
reduced future climate harm, the liability mechanism may seem vulnerable to
the maturity mismatch problem. The latter refers to situations whereby the
benefits of an investment arrive too late for a firm to be able to repay its debt,
or for a bank to honor withdrawals by depositors. It is a serious concern, because
the maturity mismatch problem is at the core of the main models of bank runs
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and, more generally, of systemic risk to financial
and insurance systems (Bobtcheff et al., 2016). Yet, substantial differences
between a liability scheme and the banking system lead us to believe that,
while deserving attention, the issue is unlikely to put the liability mechanism at
risk. First, although countries can choose their exposure to climate risk, they
cannot choose the maturity of climate risk because it is exogenous. As a result,
the moral hazard issue is less severe than that usually attached to the banking
sector (Farhi and Tirole, 2012). Second, the very participation of countries
to the liability scheme reduces rather than magnifies the overall magnitude
of climate risk. Moreover, exposure to the maturity mismatch problem is less
severe under a liability scheme than under, say, the equivalent tax scheme: both
generate the same climate benefits while cumulative liability payments are less
at any date (Billette de Villemeur and Leroux, 2012).4 Third, maturity risk
is actually foreseeable because liability payments are proportional to marginal
harm, which is evaluated on the basis of trends rather than on contemporary
realizations of harm. Thus, just like the rest of the (re-)insurance sector, the
liability scheme can be considered to be exempt from the systemic risk issue
(Kessler, 2014).
This article is related to several works concerned with addressing the inter-
generational aspect of environmental policy by transferring income to the earlier
generations (who are making mitigation efforts) from the later generations (who
enjoy the benefit of a less degraded climate). Formulated in OLG models, the
income-transferring devices can take the form of debt financing (Bovenberg and
Heijdra, 1998), of an intergenerational trust fund (Gerlagh and Keyzer, 2001),
4We adopt the view that failing to honor tax payments is just as serious a breach of respon-
sibility than failing to honor liability payments. Both instruments are a financial manifestation
of the environmental debt contracted by emitters.
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or of a pension “deal” between young and old (as in PAYGO pension systems;
von Below et al., 2016). All find that efficiency and Pareto improvements over
the business-as-usual scenario can be achieved. The fact that a liability scheme
spreads payments over time is also a step towards relieving the current gener-
ation of some of the costs of its effort. Moreover, climate risk is now borne
by emitters—rather than by countries suffering climate harm—so that, as com-
pared to ex ante instruments, a liability scheme induces important changes
around how risk is shared, both over generations and spatially. In our setting,
capital accumulation is exogenous (but unconstrained) to rather account for the
heterogeneity of countries. Heterogeneity allows us to give insights about the
possibility of decentralizing important parameters (beliefs and discounting) and
about the sharing of risk (both spatial and intertemportal).
The ability to decentralize views on discounting is particularly useful be-
cause the choice of a discount rate is at the heart of debates in the literature
on the social cost of carbon, including the well-known Stern-Nordhaus debate
(Nordhaus, 2007) and the Weitzman-Gollier puzzle (Buchholz and Schumacher,
2008; Gollier and Weitzman, 2010). The stakes surrounding these debates are
extremely high, which does not make it easy for stakeholders to reach an agree-
ment. By decentralizing the discount rate, a liability scheme attenuates the
tensions surrounding negotiations (Section 5.3.2). Moreover, being able to ex-
press a country-specific discount rate is all the more useful as inter- and intra-
regional inequalities have an impact on the appropriate value of the discount
rate (Dennig et al., 2015).
In some sense, our thought experiment parallels that of Weitzman (2017),
which suggests that countries should vote on the social cost of carbon along the
principle of one-person one-vote, a median-voter result then yielding the appro-
priate (uniform) global tax rate. Instead, by relying on a market mechanism to
aggregate differing opinions, we avoid the bias attached to focusing on median
values, which generally do not coincide with optimal values.
3 A market for climate liabilities
Consider a set N = {1, ..., n} of countries and denote by eit the flow of emissions
of Country i during period t. Emissions are an input in the production function
and give rise to a flow of benefits: bit
(
eit
)
.
We assume that each country, i, is endowed with time preferences that can
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be represented by the standard exponential discounting model with its own
constant discount factor, 0 < βi < 1.
5 Thus, each country taken in isolation
exhibits a time-consistent emissions plan that is easy to characterize. This is
for expositional purposes only, because our results would go through if countries
adopted a non-constant discount factor, as the logic would be unaffected (see
footnote 10).6
Define a reference date, t = 0, as a starting point to the mechanism. Emis-
sions have a persistence rate of γ,7 so that the contribution of Country i to the
atmospheric stock of GHGs since the reference date is
Sit =
t∑
s=0
γt−seis − Si0, (1)
where Si0 is the stock attributable to Country i at the reference date.8 Each
period, the stock of GHGs generates a (stochastic) flow of excess harm hit (St)
in Country i, relative to the baseline year.9 We denote by Ht (St) =
∑
i h
i
t (St)
the flow of global excess harm, where St =
∑n
i=1 S
i
t . From now on, we will use
the term “harm” to mean “excess harm”, for convenience.
Denote by M ⊆ N the coalition of participating countries. To be a member
of the coalition M , a country must 1) agree to be a part of it (the mechanism
is voluntary) and 2) be in good standing with respect to its climate liability
payments (no delinquent climate debt). The financial contributions requested
of countries are based upon their contributions to the stock of GHGs, the cause
of climate harm. In each period, contributions to the carbon stock are priced at
λt—possibly set equal to the current global marginal harm, H
′
t, as will be the
5Since Koopmans (1960), it is known that this functional form is the only one that grants
independence and stationarity to (individual countries’) solutions of dynamic choice problems.
By allowing countries to exhibit heterogeneous discount rates, our (multi-agent) problem is
equivalent to one with a (single) representative agent endowed with a non-constant discount
rate (Weitzman 1998, 2001; Gollier and Zeckhauser, 2005; Heal and Millner, 2014).
6Uncertainty about the proper discount rate is another reason why discounting ought to
be done at a non-constant (decreasing) rate (Gollier and Weitzman, 2010).
7For ease of exposition, we shall assume the decay rate to be constant over time and inde-
pendent of GHG concentration. In all likelihood, it is not the case. Section 4.1.1 discusses why
departures from this assumptions are actually not problematic from an ex post perspective.
8It is actually not required to trace back emissions to infinity. In fact, accounting only
for, say, post-1990 emissions would result in the very same emissions pattern. The truncation
simply amounts to lump-sum transfers to larger historical emitters while preserving incentives
at the margin, as we discuss in Section 5.3.6.
9Formally, excess harm is obtained by subtracting from the observed damage at date t,
dit (St + S0), a damage value, di0 (S0), associated to the reference date: hit (St) = dit (St + S0)−
di0 (S0), where S0 =
∑n
i=1 Si0. We assume that the hit’s are positive and increasing in their
argument.
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focus of our analysis—so that Country i ∈ M is charged λtSit as harm occurs.
Proceeds are then distributed in proportion to harm among the participating
countries: Country i ∈ M receives
(
λt
∑
j∈M S
j
t
) [
hit (St) /
∑
j∈M h
j
t (St)
]
as
compensation.
Note that per capita considerations are absent of our analysis, both on the
liability side and on the compensation side. Regarding liability, although de-
mographic changes may influence the effective impact of liability payments on
individuals over time, our focus is on efficiency. This requires the mechanism to
apply directly to the emissions of countries, regardless their source (and, also,
regardless of demography). Moreover, regarding compensation, if one makes
the first-order approximation that harm is proportional to population, compen-
sating countries in proportion to harm amounts to accounting both for hetero-
geneity in population and in per capita harm.
Consider now the incentives generated by this mechanism. Assuming that
the coalitionM is stable over time, Country i’s objective function is to maximize,
at each date t, the expected discounted sum of its payoffs:
max
{eiu}+∞u=t
Eit

+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti
biu (eiu)− hiu (Su)− λuSiu + λu
∑
j∈M
Sju
 hiu (Su)∑
j∈M h
j
u (Su)
 ,
(2)
where Eit denotes the expectation by Country i at date t.
Country i’s optimal emissions pattern is then given by:
dbit
deit
=
d
deit
Eit

+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti
hiu (Su) + λu
Siu −
∑
j∈M
Sju
 hiu (Su)∑
j∈M h
j
u (Su)

(3)
=
d
deit
Eit

+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti
hiu (Su) + λu
Siu
(
1− h
i
u (Su)∑
j∈M h
j
u (Su)
)
−
 ∑
j∈M\{i}
Sju
 hiu (Su)∑
j∈M h
j
u (Su)
 .
(4)
In practice, the ratio hit (St) /
∑
j∈M h
j
t (St) cannot be affected by any one coun-
try’s emissions over a single period. Similarly, the emissions of one country in a
given period cannot affect the liability rate λt, even if it is anchored to marginal
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harm, H ′t (St). It follows that (4) can be rewritten as:
dbit
deit
= Eit
{
+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti
[
∂hiu
∂Su
+ λu
(
1− h
i
u (Su)∑
j∈M h
j
u (Su)
)]
∂Siu
∂eit
}
, (5)
where ∂Siu/∂e
i
t = γ
u−t.
We shall work under the benchmark assumption that each country’s harm
is small relative to the global harm and that the size of the coalition M is
large enough for redistribution not to impact incentives. (Appendix B shows
how incentives are affected when the coalition M is small.) These standard
assumptions lead to:10
dbit
deit
= Eit
{
+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti γ
u−tλu
}
. (6)
When setting λt ≡ H ′t, the latter expression becomes:
dbit
deit
= Eit
{
+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti γ
u−t dHu
dSu
}
= τ it , (7)
where τ it is the standard Pigovian tax on emission flows associated with discount
factor βi and the expectations operator E
i
t .
11,12
If discount factors and expectations operators are identical across countries,
the socially optimum emissions path is easy to define. The τ it ’s are then all
equal to the optimal Pigovian tax and the liability mechanism, with λt ≡ H ′t,
thus implements the first-best allocation.
When discount factors and/or expectations differ, the social optimum is ill-
defined. For instance, heterogeneity in the discount factors necessarily results in
time inconsistency of the representative agent (Zuber, 2011; Jackson & Yariv,
2015).13 Moving away from the representative-agent approach, we argue that
10If the discount factor is not time invariant, so that it can be denoted βi,t, then β
u−t
i in
Expressions 2-7 should be substituted by
∏u
s=t βi,s. As mentionned in footnote 7, a similar
operation can be made with the decay rate γ.
11In a different setting, Benchekroun and Long (1998) establishes a similar equivalence
between an optimal tax on pollution stock with an optimal tax on flows.
12In the symmetric case, as the one considered in Gersbach and Winkler (2011), a liability
scheme can lead to optimal incentives as soon as more than one country participates: setting
λt = |M |H′t/ (|M | − 1), leads to Expression (7) because then λt
(
1− h
i
t(St)∑
j∈M h
j
t (St)
)
= H′t 
∂hit
∂St
.
13Heal & Millner (2018) recently evidenced that the heterogeneity of discount factors does
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the mechanism generates proper incentives because it yields allocative efficiency
at each period (marginal benefits are equalized at all times); moreover, it does
so while granting equal weight to the opinion of each country.
Proposition 1. Climate liabilities generate proper incentives towards the effi-
cient emissions pattern.
Clearly, a scheme equivalent to heterogenous τ it ’s would generate inefficien-
cies because marginal benefits would not be equal across countries. To har-
monize these implicit tax rates, we introduce a climate liability market, which
operates as follows. Upon emitting GHGs in the atmosphere, Country i is is-
sued ’climate liabilities’ commensurate to its emissions, lit = e
i
t. Liabilities do
not expire, but instead decay at the same rate, γ, as GHGs. They are traded
on a world market at price pt among countries in the participating coalition.
Denote by xit the net quantity of liabilities sold by Country i in period t. The
outflow of payments14 associated with the sale of current liabilities is ptx
i
t while
Country i’s cumulative liability holdings in period t writes as:
Lit =
t∑
u=0
γt−u
(
liu − xiu
)
. (8)
Accordingly, liability bearers are required to pay damages over time as climate
harm occurs, so that Country i is now charged λtL
i
t in period t. Holding climate
liability becomes akin to holding debt.
In practice, as debt grows, national economies often incur extra costs due to
increased borrowing constraints (Wachtel and Young, 1987; Engen and Hub-
bard, 2004; Laubach, 2009). We account for this by introducing a convex cost
function, Cit , associated with holding climate debt.
15
The objective of Country i becomes:
max
{eiu,xiu}+∞u=t
Eit

+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti
biu (eiu)− hit (St)− λuLiu + λu ∑
j∈M
Sju
hiu (Su)
Hu (Su)
− puxiu − Ciu
(
Liu
) .
(9)
not rule out time inconsistency outright, but imposes the equally troublesome requirement
that “the welfare weights attached to individual’s utilities evolve appropriately with calendar
time”.
14Because the buyer endorses the responsibility for future payments associated to the lia-
bility, it will only agree to hold it in exchange of payment from the seller to the buyer.
15The cost of holding debt is country specific so as to reflect the heterogeneity of countries,
including in their amount of other, non climate-related financial debt.
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This program yields the following first-order condition:
eit :
dbit
deit
= Eit
{
+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti γ
u−t
(
λu +
dCiu
dLiu
)}
, (10)
xit : pt = E
i
t
{
+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti γ
u−t
(
λu +
dCiu
dLiu
)}
. (11)
When both (10) and (11) hold true, the marginal benefit of emissions is equal
to the market liability price. In other words:
Proposition 2. The introduction of a market for liabilities implicitly yields a
single global (shadow) price of emissions.
In essence, climate liabilities act as tradable Arrow-Debreu-type securities
that make markets more complete, thus yielding allocative efficiency through de-
centralization. Countries that expect global harm to be larger—relative to other
countries—and that place a higher value on the welfare of future generations
wish to get rid of their liability and end up being net sellers. At one extreme,
some countries may even sell as much liability as allowed by their emissions ;
those countries actually emit GHGs as if emissions were priced at a higher rate
than the market price.16 Conversely, countries that expect global harm to be
smaller and place a lower value on the welfare of future generations are willing to
hold additional liabilities in exchange of monetary compensation. Hence, even
countries that are typically reluctant to take part in a climate agreement see
a financial advantage in participating in the climate liability mechanism.17 At
the extreme, countries with little regard for climate harm and likely to succumb
to short-termism may wish to acquire as much liability as possible in order to
reap the immediate lump-sum payments. In principle, such cases should be the
exception, because accumulating liabilities is very costly: financial costs rise as
liability grows, due to a country’s financial rating deteriorating. Moreover, de-
faulting on payments should be considered with care by countries, owing to the
fact that climate liabilities are a financial title like any other: defaulting would
16This situation amounts to a corner solution in xit, where
dbit
deit
= Eit
{
+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti γ
u−t
(
λu +
dCiu
dLiu
)}
> pt.
17As mentioned, the mechanism supposes that a country must fully take part in the mech-
anism—i.e., to be attributed liabilities for its own emissions and to be in good standing with
regards to paying the associated damages—in order to be allowed purchase liabilities on the
market.
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not only exclude the country from receiving compensation transfers—as per the
mechanism itself—but may also likely result in exclusion from other financial
markets. We discuss additional safety mechanisms to prevent such cases from
occuring in Section 5.2.3.
Notice that when λt ≡ H ′t, the equilibrium liability price is greater than
the expected discounted marginal harm (Expression 11). This is because of the
cost of holding liability, which reflects the default probabilities of countries. At
the country level, the higher the default risk, the larger that country’s marginal
cost of holding liability, and the greater the incentive to get rid of it. At the
aggregate level, this puts an upward pressure on the liability price—a seller
must offer to pay more to find a willing buyer—which, in turn, further reduces
global emissions.
By its ex post nature, the effectiveness of the climate liability scheme relies
on the assurance that countries will honor their liability payments over time. If
countries were to default on their payments, populations suffering harm would
not be compensated. Not only that, but the very anticipation of one’s own
default would severely weaken one’s incentives to cut back on emissions.18 That
being said, defaulting is just a form of free riding. From the viewpoint of the
individual country, any climate policy, whether ex ante or ex post, will generate
incentives to free ride. The relative magnitude of the incentives to free ride is
therefore of interest. As it turns out, when redistributive effects are washed
out, it is the same under both approaches. The only difference lies in the date
at which those incentives manifest themselves. Fittingly, free-riding is more
tempting ex post in an ex post mechanism (at the payment stage), whereas it
is more tempting ex ante in an ex ante mechanism (at the agreement stage):
Proposition 3. Assume λt ≡ H ′t. When tax revenues are used to compensate
participants in proportion to harm—as with the liability scheme—the temptation
to default on liability payments (relative to that of abandoning a Pigovian tax)
is equivalent to the temptation to delay the implementation of a Pigovian tax
on emissions (relative to that of delaying the implementation of the liability
scheme).
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in Appendix A.1.
Like all international climate policies, the climate liability mechanism is a
18Section 5.1.1 discusses the institutions necessary to ensure an effective implementation of
the liability mechanism. In turn, Section 5.2 specifically discusses the issues of commitment
and credibility
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voluntary one.19 Hence, for it to be effective, there must be willing partici-
pants. This turns out to be the case under a suitably chosen liability scheme.
Aggregate welfare gains do not mean that all individual countries have an in-
centive to participate. But it implies that ad hoc monetary transfers can lead
to positive welfare gains for all. That being said, the mechanism we envision
operates transfers based on realized harm, which may not coincide with those
transfers necessary to garner participation. This is the price to pay to correct
for the inequalities generated by the spatial idiosyncracies of climate harm.20
Nevertheless, if participants are similar enough, the liability scheme results in
a Pareto improvement. Moreover, the more participants, the higher the incen-
tives to participate, which hints at the possibility of a positive unraveling effect
spurred by an initial “coalition of the willing”.
Proposition 4. For any coalition of countries, there exists a liability scheme
that generates aggregate benefits over the business-as-usual scenario. The larger
the coalition, the closer the liability scheme can be to the efficient one, which is
always beneficial when all countries participate.
Moreover, the larger the coalition of participating countries, the higher the incen-
tives to participate. In any case, if participating countries are similar enough,
the gains from reduced harm always dominate redistributive transfers, so that
the liability scheme results in a Pareto improvement.
The proof of Proposition 4 can be found in Appendix A.2.
We have laid down the basic logic of a tradable climate liability scheme.
The remainder of the article focuses on the ’Pigovian’ liability, λt ≡ H ′t. It is
devoted to discussing features inherent to the mechanism (Section 4) as well as
issues that are not directly captured by the modeling framework (Section 5).
4 Features of the mechanism
The features of the mechanism can be separated into two categories: those
related to the ex post nature of the mechanism (Section 4.1), and those related
to the fact that funds are used to compensate climate harm (Section 4.2).
19Note that a liability scheme can be applied at the subnational level, as is the case when
a federal authority has the power to impose a climate policy to its states or provinces. Then,
participation is less of a concern. What we examine here is instead the situation where no
superior authority exists, which is where the issue of participation is the most severe.
20Recall that there is no spatial relationship between climate harm and the sources of GHG
emissions (e.g., Billette de Villemeur and Leroux, 2011).
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4.1 Features related to the ex post nature of the approach
4.1.1 Relying on observed data yields better accuracy
The climate liability scheme exacts payments based on marginal harm and
on countries’ contributions to the current stock of GHGs in the atmosphere.
Marginal harm is computed on the basis of past data at each period and thus
inherits all of the informational advantages attached to an ex post approach. In
particular, implementation does not require computing the expected sum of dis-
counted future harm as is the case under ex ante instruments, like the Pigovian
tax or an equivalent cap-and-trade scheme. With liabilities, payments associ-
ated with any given ton of GHG are instead spread over time. This allows for
learning about the evolution of climate dynamics in the meantime: payments
are thus based on facts rather than on hypotheses about the (possibly distant)
future. We discuss possible approximations in Section 5.1.
Of course, even with observed data, disentangling between harm that is
caused by human activity and harm that would have occurred naturally is it-
self a daunting task. The very concept of man-made harm is implicitly based
on a counterfactual scenario absent anthropogenic emissions. Thus, assessing
man-made harm relies on comparing an observed situation to a hypothetical
one. Improvements in modelling can (with greater or lesser confidence) give us
probabilistic guidance about what could have been expected to occur without
anthropogenic emissions under various assumptions. Although such an endeavor
may raise skepticism due to the difficulty of carrying it out accurately, note that
estimating the optimal level of any ex ante instrument relies on the comparison
of scenarios that are both hypothetical—and about the distant future, at that.
Another source of uncertainty has to do with the relationship between past
emission flows and GHG concentration, as often expressed by means of a decay
rate to summarize the complex geophysical and atmospheric phenomena. This
decay rate depends notably on GHG concentration (Prather, 1996; IPCC, 2001).
Although this relationship is most likely deterministic, an accurate computation
of the evolution of atmospheric decay still requires i) an accurate prediction of
these complex natural phenomena over the very long run, and ii) a complete
forecast of future emissions over the very long run. The latter follows from the
fact that GHG concentration at a future date will depend on today’s emissions
and also on all emissions until then. As a result, the future decay rate can be
considered to be largely unknown to the decision maker. By contrast, an ex
post policy relies only on past decay rates, which can be directly computed as
17
the ratio of current GHG concentration (net of current emissions) to previous
GHG concentrations. All calculations are thus fact based rather than scenario
based.
4.1.2 Relying only on objective parameters limits misrepresentation,
as does relying on a market
The implementation of the climate liability mechanism requires only knowledge
of objective parameters: the stock of emissions attributable to each country
and the marginal harm. Hence, there is no room for strategic manipulation by
misreporting β—or any other subjective parameter—in the hopes of influencing
international agreements.
Instead of countries reporting their subjective parameters formally (or re-
vealing them through the energy spent trying to influence negotiations), the pro-
posed liability scheme uses a market mechanism to aggregate subjective views.
As a result, countries are faced with the aggregate parameters that result from
market interaction, and decide to purchase or sell liabilities acording to how
their own stance departs from the aggregate. In essence, the market for liabili-
ties asks countries to “put their money where their mouth is”.As we discuss in
Section 5.3.2, this eliminates the need for a consensus on the discount factor to
be used.
Of course, this great degree of decentralization raises the question of whether
countries would not tend to downplay the importance of future generations by
adopting low discount factors. There are actually two questions: Can a country
“adopt” a discount factor that is different from that of its population? And:
Can the (actual) discount factor of a country be “too low”?
Our answer to the first question is that if decision makers display a sys-
tematic bias for the present—say, to inflate their performance while in office,
for electoral concerns—the climate liability scheme would fail to implement the
optimal emissions path. This is not a problem of preference elicitation, but one
of political economy, which we discuss in Section 5.2.1.
The real question surrounding a country’s choice of β is the second one, about
whether the current generation places enough weight on the welfare of future
generations. However, unless one takes a paternalistic stance—for instance, on
the grounds that future generations are not represented—and decides a priori
what the correct value of β should be, the appropriate value is actually that
of the (present) population. Hence, by design, the incentives to the current
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generation reflect the true value of the discount factor.
4.1.3 The informational burden is displaced onto countries
The informational advantages identified above should not hide the fact that
climate liabilities displace the informational burden onto countries. Indeed,
even though the assessment of harm is ex post, the policy instrument is used to
influence behavior ex ante. Therefore, it is up to countries to make predictions
about future harm scenarios and to choose a discount factor.
Making predictions about man-made climate harm and taking a stance on
the weight to be attributed to future generations are simply inescapable. What-
ever the approach, climate change will remain an intertemporal problem over
the very long run that is characterized by severe uncertainty. Nevertheless,
we discuss in Section 5.1.1 the kind of institutional apparatus that may assist
countries in making predictions.
4.1.4 Mechanism is ex post, but not retroactive (unless desired)
The key feature of a climate liability mechanism is that the prospect of being
liable for future harm creates incentives to reduce emissions today. Interestingly,
the mechanism does not require tracing emissions back to infinity to provide the
“right” incentives, in the sense of leading to the optimal emissions pattern. It
is enough, from the point of view of incentives, to account for anthropogenic
emissions starting at some agreed-upon reference date only. Any starting date
will work. This allows the mechanism to comply with the basic legal principle
of constructive notice while providing a tool to address the normative role of
historical emissions.21
That being said, the choice of the starting date is of importance because the
large emitters of the distant past (mainly, the developed West) differ from the
current—and likely future—ones. Thus, the actual distribution of climate debt
will be directly affected by the chosen starting date.22 Indeed, while incentives
are unaffected, choosing an earlier starting date amounts to enacting lump-sum
transfers from early emitters to more recent and future emitters. Ultimately, the
climate liability scheme handles this important distributional concern in a way
21Obviously, for incentives to exist, “actual notice” is also needed; i.e., countries must not
only be aware of the fact that they are causing harm (constructive notice), but must also be
informed that they will be considered liable for future climate harm.
22Skeie et al (2017) confirms that the choice of a starting year is crucial in assessing countries’
contribution to climate harm.
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that is transparent and according to a rationale that is grounded in the historical
pattern of emissions. In other words, the redistribution brought about by the
choice of a starting date is strictly rooted in the climate change problem. In
Section 5.3.6 we discuss the appeal of this feature for international negotiations.
4.2 Features related to the compensation of harm
4.2.1 An insurance scheme against spatial variations in harm
A distinctive feature of the mechanism is that countries receive compensation in
proportion to the realized harm in each period. Thus, after compensation, each
participating country must suffer only a fraction of the climate harm occurring
on its own territory. As a result, the mechanism functions as an insurance
scheme against idiosyncratic climate risk. It also follows that inequalities in net
harm are reduced across countries.
Insurance coverage expands with the number of participants. If the systemic
component of the harm function is convex, full coverage may even be achieved
when participation is global.
4.2.2 Long-term risk is borne by those who are responsible for it
Under a liability scheme, long-term risk—understood as the risk of making
incorrect predictions in terms of climate scenarios—is borne by those countries
who are responsible for climate change. Indeed, because liability payments are
based upon current marginal harm and the contribution of countries to the stock
of atmospheric GHGs, it is the emitting countries that are held accountable for
long-term climate risk—to the tune of their cumulative emissions—rather than
those exposed to climate damage as it is the case with the ex ante approach.
When liabilities are traded, the purchasing countries end up bearing this risk.
However, not only will they have chosen to do so—unlike victims of climate
harm23—but they will have gained financially through the liability price.
5 Discussions
The remaining points of discussion cannot be directly addressed with our mod-
eling framework. After discussing implementation challenges and how they may
be overcome (Section 5.1), we speculate on how governments may react to a
23We thank Yann Kervinio for this observation.
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liability, both in terms of commitment (Section 5.2) and participation (Section
5.3).
5.1 Implementation
This section raises certain implementation aspects that must be considered in
order for the mechanism to be effective. They are matters of institutional design,
and strategies to avoid moral hazard regarding adaptation.
5.1.1 Institutional design
Clearly, a climate liability market requires strong institutions in order to func-
tion properly. Implementation involves five major steps: a) tracking the emis-
sions of countries, b) issuing liabilities to emitters, c) assessing harm, d) im-
posing liability payments, and e) managing the transfer of liabilities within the
market. Hence, the mechanism minimally requires a central authority. How-
ever, it is of note that some well-established institutions already handle several
of the above-mentioned duties.
a) Reliable databases exist for historical emissions which are obtained from
national accounting on the most GHG-intensive industries, like fossil fuels, ce-
ment, steel, etc. (see, e.g., International Energy Agency, 2014; CAIT Climate
Data Explorer, 2015; Boden et al., 2015). From a legal perspective, implement-
ing liability usually proves more problematic when there are many tortfeasors
and possible interaction effects between their activities. However, this concern
does not apply to climate liabilities. Climate science can determine the intensity
of radiative forcing from the concentrations of various GHGs in the atmosphere.
This knowledge, in addition to the knowledge that GHGs mix in the atmosphere,
implying that the location of climate harm is independent from the source of
emissions, is enough to guarantee that the emissions patterns of countries are
all that are needed to establish their (relative) responsibility in climate harm.
In other words, while the question of how much climate harm may be difficult
to answer, the question of who is causing the harm is not.
Aspects b) and d) could be handled by the same institutional body. That
organization will have to direct the flow of payments from liable countries to
those who are to receive compensation. It must also be able to monitor the
standing of countries with respect to their liabilities payments, in order to act
as a gatekeeper to the liability market, if not to outright enforce payments.
Finally, it would ensure that no country overstretches its liability position. For
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example, a simple but effective rule could be to impose a cap on the amount
of liability a country may hold that is in proportion to that country’s ability to
pay. To fix ideas, note that the IMF is quite close to the institutional body just
described. It is an institution that lends funds directly to national governments.
As such, it routinely tracks their debt levels and handles repayment.
As for aspect e), government bonds are traded daily on international financial
markets. The trade of climate liabilities would be no different.
The more challenging aspect is undoubtedly aspect c), the assessment of
harm. Indeed, not only is environmental harm difficult to measure, the ques-
tion of attribution—i.e., establishing how much of the harm is due to human
activity—is a difficult one, that is far from being answered.24 Nevertheless,
the complexity of the climate system does not imply that we should not strive
to develop a unifying framework to attribute harm to the human influence on
climate.25 Until such a framework is adopted, a pragmatic way out of the dif-
ficulty would be to rely on agreed-upon conventions about how much harm to
attribute to human activity. For example, countries could agree on a given per-
centage, denote it x, such that x% of the harm from extreme weather events is
attributed to anthropogenic climate change, and use it to calibrate liability pay-
ments. Insurance companies frequently assess damage, including when linked to
climate events. Many reputable research organizations on climate science, the
most prominent being the IPCC, are focused on assessing and forecasting cli-
mate harm, including for non-extreme weather events like the gradual regional
changes in temperature (slow-onset events).26 One may be concerned that such
an institutional body may be subject to the influence of certain governments.
However, note that the IPCC already makes climate predictions and estimations
of the remaining “carbon budget” that have high-stake consequences for many
countries, all the while retaining a reputation for being independent.
24Observe first that, as is well-known in cost-benefit analysis, there are several notions of
“value” (market value, use value, option value, existence value, etc.). Hence, evaluating harm
requires at least to precisely define the appropriate notion(s) of value to be considered. Doing
so is beyond the scope of this work. However, our approach can accommodate any notion
of value. Yet, this may require some careful handling, as with the extinction of species, say
polar bears, which have both a direct use value (for arctic hunter populations), an existence
value (for most of the planet’s population), and even an intrinsic value. This will result in
differentiated harm across populations.
25Allen et al. (2007) points to such a possibility. Allen (2003) had previously been one of
the first to call attention to the magnitude of the challenge.
26For such slow-onset events, it may also be useful to resort to educated rules of thumb
initially. For example, one could approximate marginal harm by dividing the trend in the
past recent years (so as to average out the randomness of the harm) by the increase in the
atmospheric stock of GHGs over the same time period.
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Also, an organization like the IPCC could provide regular forecasts upon
which countries would base their own decisions, thus saving the costs associated
with having these predictions be made redundantly by each country.
5.1.2 Moral hazard and incentives for adaptation
Because liability revenues are used to (partially) compensate climate harm, it
presumably undermines the incentives of countries to take adaptive measures
to reduce climate impacts within their borders. It is the very same moral haz-
ard problem that plagues insurance markets, for instance, which explains why
insurance policies rarely allow for complete coverage. Similarly, imposing a
threshold below which climate harm is not compensated—i.e., a deductible of
sorts—would restore the incentives to adapt at the margin. It would also avoid
costly litigation (over the magnitude of harm) for relatively small events for
which the link with climate change is difficult to assess. More generally, limiting
compensation to sizable harms would obviously ease the measurement problem.
Note that the moral hazard problem does not prevent insurance markets
from being both profitable and beneficial to society. Despite the downward
incentives on adaptation, we still believe that it is desirable to compensate
countries affected by man-made climate harm, especially because those who are
most impacted are often not those who emit the most. In essence, we believe the
public bad nature of the climate change problem supersedes this moral hazard
concern.
Moreover, just as there can be shared responsibility in an accident, shared
responsibility rules could be introduced to limit compensation in the absence of
adaptation, which would restore the incentives to adapt. For example, in cases of
obvious negligence, like knowingly developing flood-prone land, countries could
be denied compensation for the associated harm.
On top of these considerations, it is worth noting that holding climate liabil-
ities actually provides incentives for adaptation. It effectively transfers incen-
tives from the countries that incur the climate harm to the liability bearers. The
existence of a global liability price will generate incentives for countries holding
high liability positions to invest in adaptation wherever it is most productive
(including outside of its borders), thus fostering an efficient allocation of adap-
tation efforts.27 These incentives for adaptation will ultimately translate into
lower expected harm.
27The argument is similar in spirit to Harstad (2012).
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5.2 Commitment and credibility
Proposition 3 establishes that the relative temptation to renege on the climate
liability mechanism (by defaulting on liability payments) is equivalent to the
relative temptation to postpone the Pigovian carbon tax, at least theoretically.
This section discusses more broadly the vulnerability of the climate liability
mechanism to the issue of commitment and the related issue of credibility.
5.2.1 Unconcern for future generations and incentives for renegoti-
ation
An obvious limitation of the liability approach is that it requires countries to
commit to honoring payments over the very long run. This raises two political
economy-related problems, one across generations and one across countries.
Across generations: Political short-termism First, the relative short-
sightedness of governments, due to relatively short electoral cycles, may induce
them to neglect the burden they impose upon their successors. As a result,
governments may tend to underestimate the (future) cost of emitting (today)
and be inclined to allow more emissions than would be in the country’s (in-
tertemporal) interest. One can expect this lack of concern for future generations
to undermine the effectiveness of a climate liability mechanism: Governments
would emit more GHGs than is globally optimal, as if they were subject to a
much weaker—or nonexistent—climate policy.
Unfortunately, no climate policy is immune to the shortsightedness of politi-
cians. This is simply due to intertemporal nature of the climate problem and the
long timespans involved. For instance, in the case of ex ante policy instruments,
it simply takes on different forms. For fear of losing political support from busi-
nesses, politicians may be reluctant to implement an ex ante policy that has real
bite. This translates into imposing a price on emissions, as measured by effective
tax rates and cap-and-trade prices, that is widely considered by experts to be
far below most reasonable estimates of the social cost of carbon (e.g., Pindyck,
2016; Ricke et al., 2018), resulting in a weaker policy. Alternatively, the policy
may be postponed altogether, resulting in a nonexistent policy.
As already mentioned, by making it visible that debt that accumulates, we
speculate that voters will be more sensitive to the climate issue, thus disciplining
politicians in turn.
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Across countries: Temptation to default on liability payments The
second problem arises between the liable countries and those who are to be
compensated. As time goes on and as the financial burden increases over time
for liable countries, one may expect them to choose to default on their liability
payments. This could leave the countries affected by climate change without
the compensations they were promised, with possibly dramatic consequences to
their populations.
This is a legitimate concern that should not be ignored. Indeed, Bulow and
Rogoff (1989) assert that sovereign debt cannot be supported by a country’s
reputation for repayments when default carries only a ban from ever borrow-
ing in financial markets. The argument is that, by defaulting, a country can
save upon repayments, increase current consumption, and replicate the same
consumption pattern for the future without borrowing—when markets are com-
plete, by making use of securities.
In the presence of uninsurable risks, however, a country may prefer to repay
its debt so as to maintain access to the opportunities of risk diversification that
the asset market provides. As several authors pointed out (Eaton, 1990, Chari
and Kehoe, 1993), the argument of Bulow and Rogoff hinges on the fact that
the defaulting country can re-lend its outstanding debt to yet another agent in
exchange for a guaranteed stream of income. In fact, once one recognizes that
this secondary debtor is not itself committed, Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009)
have shown that debt can actually be sustainable, which is more likely when
interest rates are low.
Very recently, Bloise, Polemarchakis and Vailakis (2017) extended the result
of Bulow and Rogoff to the incomplete market case. Clearly, the debate on the
effectiveness of borrowing bans to discipline debtors is far from being closed.
A literature review by Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2009) concludes
that the problem of sovereign debt does not so much arise because of the lack
of external sanctions, but is largely determined the domestic costs of default.
This indirectly supports accounting explicitly for the costs of debt, as we have
done in the model.
Under a climate liability scheme, failure to honor liability payments is no
different than defaulting on financial debt. This is an important feature of the
mechanism over other economic instruments: a climate liability market actually
provides incentives to honor liability payments through the “financialization” of
climate harm. Defaulters would not simply have to bear the moral consequences
of reneging on their commitment, but would also suffer financial setbacks. Fur-
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thermore, we believe that the temptation to default in a liability scheme is tem-
pered by the fact that defaulting makes a country ineligible for compensations
that insure, at least partially, against the risk of climate harm.
Interaction between incentives and participation/commitment. The
political-economy problems just discussed unfold along two different dimensions.
On the one hand, the intergenerational problem yields low incentives to reduce
emissions, under both a carbon tax and a climate liability market. On the other
hand, the cross-country problem yields a participation/commitment dilemma: a
participation problem for the carbon tax (temptation to delay indefinitely) and
a commitment problem for the climate liability market (temptation to default
on payments), respectively.
However, both aspects are interwoven. A low carbon tax, while providing
limited incentives to reduce emissions, actually makes participation easier. Con-
versely, delayed participation would make any given carbon tax rate even lower
relative to the optimal one.28 Summing up, with a carbon tax, the incentives
problem alleviates the participation problem whereas the latter reinforces the
former.
The incentives and commitment problems are also related for a climate lia-
bility market, although somewhat differently. A lack of concern for future gener-
ations yields too much GHGs to be emitted, which exacerbates the commitment
problem (due to holding more liability). Conversely, anticipating default on li-
ability payments, countries have then little incentive to reduce emissions today.
In other words, contrasting with the carbon tax, the incentives and the commit-
ment problems reinforce each other. In our opinion, this is the most significant
limitation of the climate liability market.
5.2.2 The mechanism requires making provisions for the future
A consequence of the financial nature of the debt and the associated increased
government accountability (Section 5.2.1) is that governments will be compelled
to save resources for future generations. To be clear, this does not imply that
governments should immobilize capital in the event of future climate harm,
which would be an inefficient use of resources. As we discuss in Section 5.3.4,
countries are free to choose how to levy the monies they deem necessary to face
their future liability payments. Moreover, governments can choose to invest
28The fact that the social cost of carbon increases over time is supported by most integrated
assessment models (see, e.g., US Government, 2013)
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these funds productively. What matters for a country, and in particular for its
credit rating, is its overall balance sheet (the value of its assets net of its debt,
including climate liabilities).
One may question the ability of governments to make provisions for the
future, in light of the fact that several countries already face difficulties in hon-
oring their promises to retirees, for instance. However, it is noteworthy that this
tends to be the case of countries that have adopted a pay-as-you-go retirement
scheme. In such systems, the current working generation bears the charge of
the benefits to the previous one. There is no explicit debt. Hence, the financial
balance is not monitored and, therefore, there are few options to cope with the
imbalance created by the aging of populations.
By contrast, in a fully-funded pension scheme, the balance between contri-
butions and future benefits is closely monitored. Pension funds are important
financial actors, the performance of which is the object of constant scrutiny.
Contributions are regularly adjusted in a system of defined benefits, whereas
benefits follow market returns in a system of defined contribution. Either way,
there are no lasting imbalances.
We argue that the very act of making explicit (and financial) the other-
wise moral debt to future generations results in a closer examination of wealth
transfers across generations. Keeping with the analogy, a carbon tax would be
tantamount to a ’pay-as-you-emit’ scheme, whereas a climate liability market
resembles a fully-funded system, where liability returns are studied closely by
financial markets.
5.2.3 Safeguards are needed to prevent opportunistic behavior
One may be concerned that because liability payments are deferred to the future
it will encourage some countries to participate in the scheme only to quit before
large payments are required. The worst type of opportunistic behavior would
be a ’take-the-money-and-run’ tactic: massively purchase liability (and be paid
to endorse this extra liability) and exit immediately, thus keeping the money
while not honoring the debt. This is a serious concern, that must be addressed
for the mechanism to perform as intended.
First of all, recall that the mechanism restricts access to the liability market.
Access is limited to participating countries and, among them, to countries that
are honoring their liability payments. Any participating country that is behind
on its liability payments will be excluded from accumulating more liabilities
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through the market until it has fully honored its liability payments.
Secondly, observe that, by exiting, a country forgoes any claims to the com-
pensation afforded by the liability scheme. By itself, this feature of the mech-
anism does not prevent take-the-money-and-run tactics. However, it does shed
light on which countries may be tempted to behave as such: countries that are
net contributors to the system. They are also the countries that are least likely
to participate in the first place.
Finally, one could impose additional safeguards to prevent opportunistic
behavior. For example, one could limit the amount of liabilities a country can
purchase, by imposing a threshold net-liability-to-GDP ratio, common to all,
below which a country would have to stand in order to be allowed to purchase
more liabilities.
5.3 Participation
Proposition 4 established that a market for tradable climate liabilities theoreti-
cally allowed for Pareto improvements over the business-as-usual scenario. This
section takes a broader view and speculates about aspects that may affect the
likelihood of countries to participate in the scheme.
5.3.1 Payments are spread over time
The mechanism requires liability bearers to pay over time in proportion to their
stock of GHG in the atmosphere. By spreading payments, the initial phase of
a climate agreement is a smooth process rather than requiring emitters to pay
“up front” for the expected future harm attached to their emissions. This is
likely to ease countries into participating.
5.3.2 The mechanism decentralizes important parameters
An important advantage of the liability scheme is that payments do not de-
pend upon forecasts of man-made climate harm nor on any discount factor.
Accordingly, countries do not need to agree along these two dimensions in or-
der to participate in the climate liability market. Each country can express
its own beliefs about future climate harm and its own attitude towards future
generations by choosing the amount of liability it wishes to hold.29
29Shavell (1992) argues that, left to their own devices to gather information, potential tort-
feasors may lack efficient incentives to obtain information about risk under a negligence rule,
where duty of care must ascertained. However, this drawback does not apply to strict liabil-
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This can have strong implications in terms of international participation
because it circumvents the controversies over the expected impact of climate
change and the unending debate over the appropriate discount factor.30 By
reducing the number of dimensions on which countries need to agree, one can
expect a climate liability market to greatly facilitate the negotiation process
toward a powerful climate treaty.
5.3.3 The mechanism gives financial incentives to participate in the
market
A climate liability market is likely to promote participation from countries that
may initially have little interest in a scheme aimed at reducing GHG emissions.
This follows from the profit opportunities that come with participating in any
market. In fact, to take an extreme example, even a country that (sincerely)
denies the existence of the climate problem will want to participate in a climate
liability market: to this country, the purchase of any unit of liability comes
with a windfall of p, for a much lower (perceived) cost. Either for genuine
environmental concern or for financial gain, a well-designed climate liability
market can be expected to garner the participation of many countries.
By contrast, any mechanism that requires countries to pay ex ante—i.e.,
before harm is realized—is a political nonstarter for climate skeptics.
5.3.4 States remain sovereign in how to fund their liability payments
A difficulty attached to global endeavors is that governments do not like to be
bound in their policy choices. As it turns out, a climate liability approach ul-
timately gives countries full freedom in how to tackle the climate issue. This
stems from the fact that climate liabilities effectively do nothing more than to
convert emissions into financial debt. It is then up to each country to devise
its own policy in order to achieve the desired level of emissions and to finance
the corresponding debt. This can be done through a (national) tax on emis-
sions, auctioning tradable allowances, or any other instrument (or mixture of
instruments) of that country’s choice.
ity, which is the case we consider. To the contrary, strict liability holds potential tortfeasors
responsible till the end, regardless of care. Rather, it is taxation which removes responsibil-
ity—and, thus, incentives to gather information—entirely.
30See, e.g., Weisbach and Sunstein, 2008, for a review of the terms of the debate.
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5.3.5 Liability payments are uncertain
Countries may be reluctant to participate in a liability mechanism on the
grounds that countries are not contracting on monetary amounts determined
ex ante, but on payments that may vary over time, because they depend on fu-
ture marginal climate harm. This uncertainty may have negative consequences
on economies, due to uncertainty possibly scaring away investors.
This is the price to pay to be able to charge marginal harm using the most
accurate information possible. Any ex ante mechanism will charge a price that
is known at the time of emission, but this apparent advantage hides the fact
that climate harm is still a phenomenon we are learning about. With an ex
ante mechanism, the difference between actual marginal harm and expected
marginal harm at the time of emission is effectively borne by the emitters
themselves—should we discover that climate change is not as severe a prob-
lem as initially thought—or, worse, by those countries who bear the brunt of
the consequences—should climate change turn out to be an even worse problem
than anticipated. By contrast, with a liability scheme, emitters pay the actual
marginal harm regardless of prediction errors.
The liability scheme translates into financial terms part of the (climate) risk
that countries face under an ex ante mechanism. In other words, it does not in-
troduce risk; rather, it makes explicit risk that was already there. The difference
is that emitting countries bear part of the risk with a liability mechanism (as
mentioned in Section 4.2.2) whereas it is those countries that suffer the harm
that bear all of the risk under an ex ante mechanism.
5.3.6 The choice of a starting date assigns responsibility for histor-
ical emissions in a diplomatic way
A climate liability scheme may actually ease international negotiations. Indeed,
it allows countries to address issues of fairness without impinging on efficiency.
By contrast, negotiations revolving around ex ante instruments—say, a carbon
tax or, more generally, on emission targets—necessarily trade off fairness for
efficiency, which leads to compromises that are deemed unacceptable by some
on efficiency grounds and by others for fairness reasons. The coalition structure
generated by the Kyoto Protocol, with developed countries on one side and
developing countries on the other, is telling.
From a political point of view, an advantage of the climate liability scheme
is that it brings to light a stumbling block of climate negotiations that, although
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critical, is usually not explicitly addressed. Indeed, it offers a built-in framework
to decide the issue of responsibility for past emissions. This allows to depart
from the crude solutions usually put together to face the obvious heterogeneity
of countries in development status and wealth, like partitioning countries into
different groups or “Annexes”. By setting a date from which emissions will be
accounted for, a climate liability mechanism explicitly acknowledges historical
responsibility and specifies the degree to which each country should be held
accountable in relation to the amount of past emissions. The earlier this date,
the higher the burden to more developed countries, as per the high correlation of
historical emissions with current GDP levels. Moreover, fine-tuning the starting
date allows for smooth adjustments in the responsibility borne by countries.
Hence, responsibility is no longer binary.
Finally, from a qualitative standpoint, the choice of a starting date differs
significantly from choosing thresholds to partition countries into groups. First,
the choice of a starting date affects all countries, and not just the countries at
the margin of belonging or not to a category (i.e., located close to a threshold).
Next, adjustments in the starting date affect countries gradually, as opposed
to having decisive consequences to those same marginal countries while others
are not affected at all. In terms of climate agreements, negotiations about the
starting date re-balances the stakes and spreads them from a few countries to
all nations instead of entrenching the positions of opposed coalitions.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a new approach to climate policy based on climate liabilities
between countries and have demonstrated that it can lead to the same emissions
pattern as a Pigovian ex ante instrument. In fact, although it adopts an ex post
approach, unlike traditional economic instruments, we claim that the mechanism
is merely an unconventional interpretation of the familiar Pigovian principle.
Recall that Pigovian taxation was historically developed in a static setting,
where the externality could plainly be observed. The climate problem adds two
dimensions to the externality: duration and uncertainty. The Pigovian logic
can therefore be revisited accordingly. If we take the Pigovian logic to mean
the internalization by agents of all aspects related to the externality, then our
proposal applies this logic in full by relying on the countries’ own views about
discounting and on their own beliefs about future damage to induce them to
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internalize the externality.
By turning environmental debt into financial debt, the responsibility of coun-
tries becomes both explicit and more difficult to ignore, thus increasing govern-
ment accountability. It becomes explicit because the financial value of the debt
is indeed a market assessment of future harm. It becomes difficult to ignore
because “the market is watching”. The market (liability) price aggregates all
available private information and makes it public. Thus, the total value of li-
abilities at any current date is the best possible estimate of the cost of future
climate harm.
We are able to make some qualitative predictions about participation (Propo-
sition 4). Quantitative predictions about the size of the welfare gains over the
business-as-usual scenario would require making use of simulations. In this vein,
Antimiani et al. (2017) develop a CGE model to assess whether the Green Cli-
mate Fund could work as an effective transfer mechanism in securing global
participation. There, the usage of the Fund is split between compensating
abatement (i.e., economic loss from reduced production) and funding adapta-
tion (to reduce climate harm). By contrast, the transfer scheme we propose
focuses solely on compensating harm.
We have considered climate liabilities as an alternative to other, ex ante
economic instruments like a carbon tax. However, in practice, the combination
of the two is generally beneficial. In a paper on liability and taxation, Shavell
(2011) argues that “liability should be employed fully, with taxation taking
up the slack”. In our setting, it is quite clear that any weighted average of
the ’Pigovian’ liability and taxation schemes would also implement the desired
level of emissions. Therefore, without sacrificing efficiency, one can fine-tune
the relative weights of both instruments to achieve the most desirable mix of
advantages and drawbacks brought about by each.
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A Appendix
This appendix provides the proofs of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
The public good character attached to climate policy means that all climate
instruments are subject to the problem of free riding. In other words, at the in-
dividual level, one is always tempted to abandon (or to not implement) a climate
policy, regardless of the instrument (liability or tax). This section compares in
turn the relative temptation to abandon each mechanism and the relative temp-
tation to delay the implementation of each mechanisms. For the sake of isolating
the issue, we shall assume that countries are homogeneous in expectations and
share a common discount factor, β. For simplicity of exposition, we also assume
the initial stock to be zero, so that: Sit =
∑t
s=0 γ
t−seis for all i. The liability
instrument we shall consider is the ’Pigovian’ one, where emission stocks are
priced at current marginal harm: λt ≡ H ′t. This appendix makes heavy use of
the fact that this liability scheme implements the same emissions pattern as the
Pigovian tax.
A.1.1 On the relative temptation to abandon the policy
On the one hand, a drawback of the liability scheme is that countries face an
increasing temptation to default on their accumulated climate debt. On the
other hand, because climate harm is likely to increase over time, there is also
an increasing temptation to not enact a Pigovian tax.
Denote by M the set of countries implementing the policy, either the liability
scheme or a Pigovian tax. The expected cost of defaulting on climate debt from
date T onward—or, alternatively, the benefits to continued participation—is
equal to:31
∆M,iliability,T = ET

+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
bit (eM,it )− λtSM,it + λt
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(
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) − hit (SMt )
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(12)
−
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[
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t,T
)
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(
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M\i
t,T
)]}
. (13)
where we abuse notations slightly and denote by eM,it and S
M,i
t the carbon flow
and stock of Country i when countries in M implement the liability scheme
(which are the same as when countries in M implement the Pigovian tax). Also,
31Recall that defaulting on climate debt makes one ineligible for compensatory transfers.
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SMt =
∑
j∈N S
M,j
t is the total stock in the atmosphere at time t. Finally, e
M\i,i
t,T
refers to the carbon flow of Country i and S
M\i
t,T to the total stock, respectively,
after Country i has exited the mechanism at date T .
We now turn to the Pigovian tax. To disentangle the temporal aspects from
the redistributive aspects, we shall assume that all tax revenues are devoted to
compensating participating countries in proportion to harm, exactly as under
the liability scheme. This is feasible due to the fact that the Pigovian tax
is exactly equal to the sum of all future expected discounted marginal harm,
assuming perfect foresight and a rate of return r such that β = 1/ (1 + r). More
precisely, and using the fact that λt ≡ H ′t, the financial value at date T of tax
revenues made until then is equal to:
T∑
t=0
βt−T τte
M,i
t =
T∑
t=0
βt−TEt
{
+∞∑
u=t
βu−tγu−tλu
}
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βuγu−tλu
}
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=
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β−T
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t=0
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{
βuγu−tλu
}
eM,it +
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β−T
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t=0
Eu
{
βuγu−T+T−tλu
}
eM,it
(16)
=
T∑
u=0
βu−TEu {λu}SM,iu +
+∞∑
u=T+1
βu−TEu
{
λuγ
u−T}SM,iT
(17)
>
T∑
u=0
βu−TλuSM,iu (18)
where (16) obtains using a permutation on the domain of summation and
makes use of the perfect foresight assumption. Expression (18) is the finan-
cial value, at date T , of all liability payments. The gap between (14) and (18),∑+∞
u=T+1 β
u−T γu−TλuS
M,i
T , is the financial value of the extra monetary outlays
imposed up front by the Pigovian tax relative to the liability scheme. It is also
the value of tax revenue that should be saved by countries in order to be able
to compensate future harm.
Because we assume that the countries are compensated in the same manner
as with the liability scheme, the expected cost of abandoning the tax—or, again,
the benefits to continued participation—at a given date T for a country i ∈M
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is equal to:
∆M,itax,T = ET
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The rest of the argument makes use of the fact that eM,it and S
M,i
t (resp. e
M\i,j
t
and S
M\i,j
t ) are identical under both instruments. Therefore, the difference lies
only in the financial payments that are made under both scheme:
∆M,itax,T −∆M,iliability,T = ET
{
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
[
−τteM,it + λtSM,it
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(21)
= ET
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= βτT+1γS
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T (24)
= (τT − λT )SM,iT (25)
where (22) follows from by Expression (17). The difference is positive, implying
that defaulting on climate debt is more tempting (i.e., less costly) than aban-
doning the Pigovian tax. Notice that the magnitude of the difference, (24), is
equal to the present value of taxing today’s carbon stock tomorrow. Alterna-
tively, (25) expresses it as the difference between the Pigovian fee associated to
emitting today’s stock, SM,iT , and the liability fee associated to the same stock.
A.1.2 On the relative temptation to delay the policy
On the other hand, an advantage of the liability scheme is that it is almost
costless to enter. This makes the liability scheme more likely to be adopted in
the short run than an ex ante policy. To be precise, we compare the net benefits
of both schemes over the first L periods—which is equivalent to the cost of
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postponing for L periods—computed from the point of view of date zero:32
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t=0
βt
bit (eM,it )− λtSM,it + λt
∑
j∈M
SM,jt
 hit (SMt )∑
j∈M h
j
t
(
SMt
) − hit (SMt )

−
L−1∑
t=0
βt
bit (eM,it )− τteM,it + λt
∑
j∈M
SM,jt
 hit (SMt )∑
j∈M h
j
t
(
SMt
) − hit (SMt )
(26)
= E0
{
L−1∑
t=0
βt
[
−λtSM,it + τteM,it
]}
, (27)
where the second equality comes from the fact that both policies implement the
same emissions path.
Using again Expression (17), we get:
∆M,iliability−tax,L = β
L−1E0
{
β−L+1
L−1∑
t=0
βt
[
−λtSM,it + τteM,it
]}
(28)
= βL−1E0
{
+∞∑
t=L
βt−L+1λtγt−L+1S
M,i
L−1
}
(29)
= βL−1E0
{
βγ
+∞∑
t=L
βt−Lγt−Lλt
}
SM,iL−1 (30)
= βLτLγS
M,i
L−1 (31)
= βL−1 (τL−1 − λL−1)SM,iL−1 (32)
The sign of the above difference is positive, implying that the liability scheme
is strictly less costly over any finite horizon. Its magnitude is the (discounted)
expected cost of the inherited stock at date L. It can also be interpreted as the
present value, from the point of view of date zero, of the difference between the
Pigovian tax associated with emitting the stock at period L−1 and the liability
associated with that same stock.
Despite the compounded discount factor, βL, the above difference is not nec-
essarily negligible, even if L is large. In fact, when damage is a convex function of
total stock, and stock increases over time, the tax rate τL = EL
[∑+∞
t=L (γβ)
t−L dHt
dSt
]
increases with L.33 Therefore, the size of the difference can even increase with
32To focus on the temporal differences in the two schemes, we shall again assume that all
tax revenues from are devoted to compensating participating countries in proportion to harm,
exactly as under the liability scheme.
33As mentioned in the text, the fact that the social cost of carbon increases over time is
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L if τL+1/τL > 1/β. With discount factors close to one, this is a distinct
possibility.
A.1.3 Comparison
Evaluated from the point of view of date zero, we obtain from Expression (24)
that the expected relative temptation to default on liability payments at date
T writes:
βTE0 [∆tax,T −∆liability,T ] = βT+1τT+1γSM,iT > 0 (33)
Comparing with Expression (31), we see that the relative temptation to default
on climate debt mirrors the relative temptation to delay the implementation of
a Pigovian tax.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider a given liability scheme {λt}t. Ignoring the liability market for the
time being, the benefits of continued participation at date T to the liability
scheme write as follows:
ΠM,iT = E
i
T

+∞∑
t=T
βt−Ti
bit (eM,it )− λtSM,it + λt
∑
j∈M
SM,jt
 hit (SMt )∑
j∈M h
j
t
(
SMt
) − hit (SMt )

(34)
−
+∞∑
t=T
βt−Ti
[
bit
(
e∅,it,T
)
− hit
(
S∅t,T
)]}
. (35)
where we denote by eM,it and S
M,i
t the carbon flow and stock of Country i
when countries in M implement the liability scheme. Also, SMt =
∑
j∈N S
M,j
t .
Finally, e∅,it,T and S
∅
t,T refer to the carbon flow and stock, respectively, after
all countries simultaneously abandon the policy at date T (we are back to the
business-as-usual scenario from T onward).
In order to the disentangle the effects of redistribution from the pure bene-
fits of mitigation, we decompose the benefits of continued participation to the
liability scheme into two terms:
supported by most integrated assessment models.
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ΠM,iT = Φ
M,i
T + Γ
M,i
T . (36)
The first term is the benefit associated with the emissions reduction that the
liability scheme incentivizes:
ΦM,iT = E
i
T
{
+∞∑
t=T
βt−Ti
[
bit
(
eM,it
)
− hit
(
SMt
)]− +∞∑
t=T
βt−Ti
[
bit
(
e∅,it,T
)
− hit
(
S∅t,T
)]}
.
(37)
The second term corresponds to the expected transfers that are made through
the compensation of climate harm:
ΓM,iT = −EiT

+∞∑
t=T
βt−Ti λt
SM,it −
∑
j∈M
SM,jt
 hit (SMt )∑
j∈M h
j
t
(
SMt
)
 . (38)
Observe that because compensation transfers are balanced at any date we have,
for all T and all M : ∑
i∈M
ΓM,iT = 0. (39)
A.2.1 Homogeneous countries
When all countries are homogeneous (same discount factor, same beliefs, same
expected harm), no transfers are expected: ΓM,iT = 0 for all i ∈ M . Therefore,
the existence of the scheme makes Country i better off if and only if ΦM,iT is
positive.
Consider first the grand coalition (M = N). By symmetry, it is plain that
ΦN,iT = (1/N)
∑
j∈N Φ
N,j
T . Consider now the liability scheme where carbon stock
is priced at current marginal harm, λt ≡ H ′t. Because this liability scheme
generates first-best incentives (Expression 7), it maximizes
∑
j∈N
EiT
(
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
[
bjt
(
eN,jt
)
− hjt
(
SNt
)])
. (40)
Therefore, the sum
∑
j∈N Φ
N,j
T , which is the net gain of the first-best alloca-
tion over the business-as-usual outcome, is strictly positive. It follows that all
countries have an interest in participating in the efficient liability scheme.
More generally, for a coalition of M members, there is a net positive gain
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over the business-as-usual scenario that can be obtained by maximizing
∑
j∈M
(
+∞∑
t=T
βt−T
[
bjt
(
eM,jt
)
− hjt
(
SMt
)])
over the emissions
{
eM,jt
}
t≥T
, for all j ∈M . This optimum is defined by
dbjt
dejt
=
+∞∑
u=t
(βγ)
u−t
(∑
k∈M
dhku
dSu
)
,
for all t ≥ T and all j ∈ M so that it can be implemented by the means of a
liability scheme with
λMt =
∑
k∈M
dhkt
dSt
. (41)
To summarize, when countries are symmetric, any coalition M can be sus-
tained for suitable values of the liability rate. In particular, any λt ≤ λMt
generates welfare gains to every members of the coalition. (By continuity, some
values of λt > λ
M
t also generate welfare gains.)
A.2.2 Heterogeneous countries
The mechanism is designed to handle country heterogeneity. It aggregates be-
liefs and attitudes towards the future (i.e., discounting). Whether it will gener-
ate welfare gains for all will depend on how heterogeneous countries are.
Following the above analysis, for any coalition M , there exist values λt ≤ λMt
of the liability of rates such that there are net collective gains for the coalition
as a whole. This implies that ad hoc monetary transfers can lead to positive
welfare gains for all. However, the mechanism we envision operates transfers
based on realized harm, which may not coincide with those transfers necessary
to garner participation. When countries are homogeneous this is not a problem,
as we have seen, because no transfers are required. Therefore the severity of
the participation problem is directly related to the heterogeneity of countries.
In fact, when heterogeneity is not too pronounced, no transfer would actually
be needed either.
It also follows from the above analysis (Expression (41)) that higher par-
ticipation allows the liability rate λt to become closer to its efficient value λ
N
t ,
which can always be sustained when all countries participate.
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Notice that the larger the participating coalition, M , the larger the benefits
from emissions reductions, ΦM,iT , and the smaller the harm; hence, the smaller
the magnitude of the redistributive transfer, ΓM,iT . As a result, the more par-
ticipants, the higher the incentives to participate. This observation hints at
the possibility of a positive unraveling effect spurred by an initial “coalition of
the willing”. Of course, without further assumptions on the heterogeneity of
countries, one cannot say for sure how many countries will choose to partici-
pate. Clearly, if countries are so heterogeneous that some countries expect no
climate harm—or even benefit from climate change—those countries will refuse
to participate in a scheme that asks for their contribution but will never benefit
them, either through compensation (they will receive none) or by a reduction of
the overall externality (they are unaffected by it, or may even benefit from it).
Finally, the above analysis has ignored the fact that liabilities are tradable.
Because trade is voluntary, it can only enhance participation.
B Appendix not intended for publication
This appendix shows how incentives are affected when the assumption of a large
participating coalition does not hold.
Denote µi = E
i
t
[
hiu(Su)∑
j∈M h
j
u(Su)
]
, which we will assume to be independent of
u (geographical impacts of climate change do not change over time, in expected
terms). Then let λu = H
′
u. As long as 1−µi is not negligible, then (1− µi)λu =
(1− µi)
∑
j∈N
∂hju
∂Su
>>
∂hiu
∂Su
. Then Expression (5) becomes:
dbit
deit
= Eit
{
+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti γ
u−t (1− µi) dHu
dSu
}
= (1− µi) τ it . (42)
Trade on the liability market equalizes marginal benefits, as in Expressions (10)
and (11):
eit :
dbit
deit
= Eit
{
+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti γ
u−t
(
(1− µi)λu + dC
i
u
dLiu
)}
, (43)
xit : pt = E
i
t
{
+∞∑
u=t
βu−ti γ
u−t
(
(1− µi)λu + dC
i
u
dLiu
)}
. (44)
Incentives to reduce emissions are lessened, but this can be addressed by setting
a larger liability rate: λu > H
′
u.
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